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these myths, this paper demonstrates the lack of legal support for the "public
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of destroying economic stability and bringing misery to all. Second, that high-pow-
ered incentives paid to "talent" in finance are a fundamental cause of the exces-
sive risk-taking, chicanery, and financial fraud that contributes to instability.
Without a new compensation system that rewards banking and finance for contrib-
uting to sustainable economic progress rather than for economic rent-seeking and
a renewed regulatory system that punishes chicanery and financial crime and near-
crime, there is unlikely to be any change in the behavior of the financial world.
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allied groups have to participate in rewriting the rules and regulations governing
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Sufferers of food allergies can experience anaphylactic shock, and even death,
within minutes of exposure to allergens such as peanuts, soy, wheat, eggs, milk,
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rooms and classrooms places children with food allergies in danger while they are
entrusted to the government's care. Since these children, especially young chil-
dren, cannot be relied upon to be able to avoid allergens on their own, reasonable
and logical laws should be in place to ensure that children are safe while in school.
However, such laws do not exist. Accordingly, this note provides an overview of
the insufficiency of today's disparate federal and state laws, and proposes a model
code that is designed to protect children with food allergies.
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When two fundamental rights are in conflict, such that the protection of one
requires the infringement of the other, courts must weigh those rights against each
other to determine which is ultimately greater. In Frazier v. Winn, the Eleventh
Circuit dealt with precisely such an issue: specifically, the rights of parents pitted
against those of their children. This note explores the history of both parental
rights and student's rights in school to show why the court appropriately affirmed
that children's right to free speech is only as expansive as their parents allow,
justified by the parents' fundamental right to rear their children as they see fit.
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A recent Eleventh Circuit case, Frazier ex reL Frazier v. Winn, upheld as
facially constitutional a Florida statute that requires a student to obtain parental
permission before abstaining from participation in the Pledge of Allegiance. This
note argues that the court reached the wrong conclusion because it failed to prop-
erly weigh the students' right to free speech against the parents' right to control
the upbringing of their children. This note argues that Justice Breyer's framework
for balancing conflicting rights should be adopted for use in this context. By apply-
ing Justice Breyer's balancing test, the Florida statute should be found to be un-
constitutional because the requirement of parental permission to refrain from
participation in the Pledge of Allegiance is a substantial interference with a stu-
dent's First Amendment rights while there is minimal interference with parental
control by allowing students to choose for themselves whether or not to partici-
pate in the Pledge of Allegiance.
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